Good summary of my argument, plus a thought on lists

Ned Foley has an excellent summary of my technical argument about STV repeals.

I wonder if the fractional-transfer approach would mitigate vote leakage.

The problem is that voters don’t understand it, which is what spurred the original post.

I argue in the book that there are three ways to deal with this: have a multiparty system (that can dictate rankings and/or in which it is incentive-compliant for a majority to retain the system), use list-based allocation (possibly within STV), or somehow maintain a majority that can limit its own nominations.

My hunch is that similar issues (minus ranking and limiting endorsements) also might apply to D’Hondt. Thoughts?

The “disenfranchised independent” argument

The Fulcrum has a piece on “opening” New York State primaries. It makes a familiar argument:

Primary elections are crucial to our electoral outcomes because they determine which representatives have a better standing in the general election.

There is nothing stopping independent voters from running a candidate in a general election — except maybe their inability to agree on that candidate.

And getting people to agree on one candidate (or technically a number that can win) is a major reason why “parties” emerge.

I put “parties” in quotation marks for two reasons. One is that many hear it as an anti-reform cudgel. The other is that “parties” may not track the two-party divide. I am thinking here of quasi-party organizations like Cincinnati’s Charter Committee or the Murkowski organization in Alaska.

Numerous public officials have won office as independents. Names that come to mind include Bloomberg, Lieberman, Ventura, and Weicker. Each of them did so on their own ballot line in a general election.

It’s time to retire the claim that nominating primaries equal disenfranchisement.

Mapping the repeal of proportional representation in New York City

I may have more to say about this later.

Two sorts of hypotheses might explain the variation. One concerns third-party strength (Labor, Liberal, Communist). But ecological inference suggests a divided Labor Party!

The other sort concerns politics of urban renewal. This may help explain the pockets of opposition in Bronx and Brooklyn. Also in the book, I analyze the City Council roll-call record. Those data suggest a faction of the Republican Party feuding with the O’Dwyer (D) administration and other Republicans on budget matters.

Another point worth mentioning: this was one of few repeals (the only?) that increased assembly size. So, there may be a counterintuitive representation story too.

Feel free to comment if anything strikes you.