Good summary of my argument, plus a thought on lists

Ned Foley has an excellent summary of my technical argument about STV repeals.

I wonder if the fractional-transfer approach would mitigate vote leakage.

The problem is that voters don’t understand it, which is what spurred the original post.

I argue in the book that there are three ways to deal with this: have a multiparty system (that can dictate rankings and/or in which it is incentive-compliant for a majority to retain the system), use list-based allocation (possibly within STV), or somehow maintain a majority that can limit its own nominations.

My hunch is that similar issues (minus ranking and limiting endorsements) also might apply to D’Hondt. Thoughts?

Mapping the repeal of proportional representation in New York City

I may have more to say about this later.

Two sorts of hypotheses might explain the variation. One concerns third-party strength (Labor, Liberal, Communist). But ecological inference suggests a divided Labor Party!

The other sort concerns politics of urban renewal. This may help explain the pockets of opposition in Bronx and Brooklyn. Also in the book, I analyze the City Council roll-call record. Those data suggest a faction of the Republican Party feuding with the O’Dwyer (D) administration and other Republicans on budget matters.

Another point worth mentioning: this was one of few repeals (the only?) that increased assembly size. So, there may be a counterintuitive representation story too.

Feel free to comment if anything strikes you.

Some key points from “More Parties or No Parties”

These are posted on Medium.