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Category: proportional representation

Posts related to proportional representation (PR), mostly in the United States.

Good summary of my argument, plus a thought on lists

Ned Foley has an excellent summary of my technical argument about STV repeals.

I wonder if the fractional-transfer approach would mitigate vote leakage.

The problem is that voters don’t understand it, which is what spurred the original post.

I argue in the book that there are three ways to deal with this: have a multiparty system (that can dictate rankings and/or in which it is incentive-compliant for a majority to retain the system), use list-based allocation (possibly within STV), or somehow maintain a majority that can limit its own nominations.

My hunch is that similar issues (minus ranking and limiting endorsements) also might apply to D’Hondt. Thoughts?

Mapping the repeal of proportional representation in New York City

I may have more to say about this later.

Two sorts of hypotheses might explain the variation. One concerns third-party strength (Labor, Liberal, Communist). But ecological inference suggests a divided Labor Party!

The other sort concerns politics of urban renewal. This may help explain the pockets of opposition in Bronx and Brooklyn. Also in the book, I analyze the City Council roll-call record. Those data suggest a faction of the Republican Party feuding with the O’Dwyer (D) administration and other Republicans on budget matters.

Another point worth mentioning: this was one of few repeals (the only?) that increased assembly size. So, there may be a counterintuitive representation story too.

Feel free to comment if anything strikes you.

Philadelphia’s at-large seats

Today was primary day in Philly. Below is a portion of the ballot. I found myself relying on the “Vote for not more than X” instructions.

The race of interest is council-at-large. Here we are selecting five Democratic nominees to contest seven seats in November. (No party may give its label to more than five.)

This is where I pitch the “one-vote system.” All of the above candidates could run in the general without spoiling their party. There would be no further need to limit nominations by law. And the act of voting would be more user-friendly.

Some key points from “More Parties or No Parties”

Photo by Phil Howe. Book available for purchase and in Oxford Scholarship Online.

The space of politics is multidimensional. What we call “left” and “right” are negotiated positions.

Interest groups (broadly understood) do the negotiating. They are assumed to want control of government. They form coalitions to get it.

Every democracy has some coalition structure, even if it does not track party division.

‘Shifting coalitions’ lead to electoral reform: incumbent groups seeking insulation, out-of-power groups seeking realignment, or opposing groups seeking to discipline noncommittal players (a polarizing mode).

Electoral reform is change in any of five electoral-system components: assembly size, district magnitude, ballot type, allocation rules, and rules about nominations.

Two-party politics makes it tempting to cater to factions, not parties, when proposing and designing reforms. Witness the current emphasis on ballot type and nominations (ranked-choice, approval voting, nonpartisan primaries). Witness the unpopularity (outside political science) of allocation rules that presume party grouping (such as party-list proportional representation, including mixed-member).

In the past, reformers promoted single transferable vote (STV) and ranking generally in order to cater to factions, not parties.

In other countries, multiparty politics facilitates use of ranked-choice: giving voters understandable entities to rank, instructing voters on how to rank (vote management), regulating candidate entry (vote management), and generating political will to administer a complex system.

In the United States, ranked-choice reforms tended to last as long as the coalitions that imposed them.

Vote management was imperfect and slow to emerge. It usually involved a bipartisan coalition that sold itself in “good government” terms.

Due to vote management, STV produces winners who usually would be the same under open-list proportional representation (OLPR).

An exception is when the coalition structure shifts, such that some voters do not rank candidates in the way that party (or interest-group) leaders might want. Said voters are part of a coalition structure that is different from the prevailing one.

If the alternative coalition deprives “left” and “right” of control of government, they may join in blaming the electoral system. This can lead to a polarizing repeal episode.

Reasons for abandonment of majoritarian ranked-ballot rules are not yet well-understood. One theme in the literature is ranking truncation. Another is the production of surprise results. These may have reinforced each other: many voters not ranking very many choices, determined candidates capitalizing on this.

The repeal of early ranked-choice systems left in place features that had been needed to pass ranked-choice. These include nonpartisan ballots, numbered-post elections, and single-digit assemblies.

This post also appeared at on Medium.

What is new (and not) about the proposed Portland charter?

Not much is new — except for combining staggered elections, via the single transferable vote (STV), with a mayor-council system.

An opponent of the proposed Portland (OR) charter writes:

This combination of multi-member districts and ranked choice voting, which has never been tried in any other large U.S. city, is being sold on the idea that it would promote racial, ethnic and gender diversity. But I for one am not buying. Before you decide that Portland, of all places, needs such a convoluted process to avoid electing only white males, take a look at the makeup of our current city council.

The key features of the proposed charter are: elections via STV in multiple multi-seat districts, council expansion from 5 to 12 seats, staggered elections (two districts at a time), nonpartisan elections, and a separately elected mayor.

STV in a “large U.S. city” clearly is not new. Some large cities have been New York (1937-47), Cincinnati (1925-57), and Worcester (MA, 1949-61). Those date ranges are from first election to repeal. Cincinnati was the 18th largest city in the U.S. at the time it repealed STV. Worcester was (and remains) the second-largest city in New England. All three are key cases from my book. There were other large cities.

STV used across multiple multi-seat districts in a large U.S. city also is not new. Cleveland (1923-31), West Hartford (1921-3), and New York City each had multiple multi-seat districts. West Hartford was not that large, but the other two certainly were. (In modern times, Eastpointe [MI] and Albany [CA] have adopted STV with multiple multi-seat districts.)

What about STV for a large assembly? Most cases had councils of 7 or 9 seats. New York City’s fluctuated with voter turnout, owing to use of a fixed quota (75,000 valid first-choice votes), and ranged from 17 (1943) to 26 seats (1937). Cleveland’s assembly had 25 members.

What about STV with staggered elections? Boulder (CO, 1917-47) had these — 3 of 9 seats at a time. (In modern times, Eastpointe [MI] uses STV with staggered elections.)

What about STV with a separately elected mayor? See New York City. All other cases had the council-manager form of government.

So, New York City comes closest to having what Portland might — minus NYC’s Board of Estimate, party endorsements on ballots, and fixed quota — and minus Portland’s staggered elections.

Also interesting is Portland’s current charter, which originated (1913) in an earlier movement for ‘majority-preferential’ elections. Pro- and anti-party reformers alike decried this reform package — including when it came with runoffs instead — which was based on numbered-post elections:

“[T]he fatal defect in all these systems is that they do not provide for minority representation,” wrote one reformer. “All of them eliminate all minorities from the governing body, either council or commission. This defect the proportional representation system will remedy.”

The above critique led directly to the “representative council” plan of local government, a.k.a. council-manager with STV elections. (Note: “all these systems” above also referred to council-manager government without proportional representation.)

So, from the perspective of replacing numbered-post elections with STV, Portland is doing what some old reformers advised. (Eastpointe [MI] did the same when it adopted STV in 2019.)

If you are interested in the Portland charter fight, Jay Lee and Maja Harris (blog) are excellent to follow.