One hazard of studying electoral systems is being mistaken for an activist. I once shared a hunch about this with a mentor, and his response was: “Of course!” It probably does not help if one gives public-facing advice, as I have.

How do my views on proportional representation differ from those of an advocate? I recently prompted GPT 5.5 for one possible answer.

Here is what came back:

Jack Santucci approaches proportional representation (PR) more as an institutional analyst than as a straightforward advocate. A typical PR advocate usually argues that proportional systems are normatively superior because they produce fairer representation, reduce wasted votes, and encourage multiparty democracy. Santucci is more cautious, more historically grounded, and more attentive to tradeoffs.

Here are the main differences:

Issue	Santucci’s Position	Typical PR Advocate’s Position
Core orientation	Analytical and conditional	Normatively pro-PR
Main concern	How PR changes party systems and incentives	Making representation fairer and more proportional
View of parties	Sees parties and factions as central institutional actors	Often emphasizes voters and underrepresented viewpoints
Historical explanation	PR emerges from party splits and elite coalitions	PR emerges because reformers seek fairness/democracy
View of STV	Skeptical about some effects of STV	Often strongly supportive of STV
Tradeoffs	Emphasizes coordination problems, party weakening, and instability risks	Emphasizes inclusion and reduced polarization

Santucci’s scholarship repeatedly argues that PR reforms are usually driven by strategic political coalitions rather than pure democratic idealism. In his article Party Splits, Not Progressives, he argues that many U.S. cities adopted PR because factions of ruling parties allied with minority parties to weaken dominant party machines. That differs from the common advocate narrative that PR was mainly a reform movement for fairness and representation.

Another key difference is his treatment of political parties. Many PR advocates see stronger multiparty competition as inherently beneficial. Santucci instead focuses on how electoral systems reshape party organization and discipline. In more recent work, he argues that some forms of PR — especially the single transferable vote (STV) — can weaken parties through “vote leakage,” where voters transfer support unpredictably across party lines.

A conventional PR advocate might say:

• PR lets every political tendency win representation proportional to its support.
• Multiparty democracy is healthier than two-party competition.
• Systems like STV maximize voter choice.

Santucci is more likely to say:

• PR can work in the U.S., but only under certain coalition conditions.
• Different PR systems produce very different party dynamics.
• Candidate-centered PR systems like STV may undermine coherent party government.

Interestingly, Santucci is not anti-PR. In recent work with other scholars, he has supported forms of proportional representation for U.S. federal elections as a way to reduce polarization and improve representation. But even there, his argument is institutional and pragmatic rather than idealistic. He treats PR as a tool with costs and benefits, not as a democratic cure-all.

So the simplest comparison is:

• A PR advocate typically argues: “PR is more democratic.”
• Santucci typically argues: “PR changes how parties, factions, and representation work — sometimes for the better, sometimes not.”¹

I also prompted ChatGPT as follows: “Can you reproduce the table with two kinds of advocates instead of one? Use your judgment to define the advocates.” Here is what came back:

Issue	Jack Santucci	Reformist / Good-Government PR Advocate	Movement / Pluralist PR Advocate
Core orientation	Institutional and historical analysis	Improve governance quality and electoral fairness	Expand representation for diverse political and social groups
Main question	How do electoral rules reshape parties and coalitions?	How can elections produce fairer and more functional outcomes?	How can more voices gain meaningful political power?
View of PR	A tool with contingent effects	A corrective to distortions of winner-take-all elections	A democratic necessity for inclusive politics
Main benefits emphasized	Depends on design and party structure	Fewer wasted votes, moderation, better incentives	Multiparty democracy, minority representation, ideological diversity
Main risks emphasized	Party fragmentation, weak coordination, unstable coalitions	Possible complexity or fragmented legislatures, but manageable	Usually downplays fragmentation risks in favor of inclusion
View of parties	Parties and factions are the key actors	Parties should channel competition responsibly	Existing major parties are often barriers to representation
Historical explanation for PR adoption	Often driven by elite strategy and party splits	Driven by democratic reform efforts	Driven by social exclusion under two-party systems
Preferred system types	Sensitive to institutional details; skeptical of some candidate-centered forms	Often supports moderate list PR or mixed systems	Often enthusiastic about STV or open-list systems maximizing voter choice
View of STV	Can weaken party coherence through transfer dynamics	Attractive because voters rank candidates and reduce wasted votes	Attractive because it empowers candidates, independents, and smaller movements
View of two-party system	A product of electoral incentives, not inherently illegitimate	Too rigid and polarizing for modern democracy	Structurally exclusionary and insufficiently representative
Polarization	Depends on how PR interacts with party structure	PR may reduce zero-sum partisan conflict	More parties create healthier ideological expression
Democratic ideal	Effective and coherent party government	Fair competition plus governability	Maximum political inclusion and descriptive representation
Typical tone	Conditional and empirically cautious	Optimistic but institutionalist	Normatively committed and participatory
Representative figures	Jack Santucci	Lee Drutman, Douglas Amy	Lani Guinier, Arend Lijphart

One way to summarize the contrast:

• The reformist advocate says: “PR improves democratic performance.”
• The movement advocate says: “PR gives excluded groups real political power.”
• Santucci says: “PR restructures party competition, and its effects depend heavily on institutional design.”

Finally, I asked GPT: “Can you reproduce the table with three kinds of advocates instead of one? Use your judgment to define the advocates.” The model split the “reformist” category from the two-type exercise into “governance/anti-polarization” and “fairness” camps. I’ll omit the table this time. Here was GPT’s bottom line:

Another way to frame the contrast:

• The electoral fairness advocate focuses on proportionality itself.
• The governance advocate focuses on incentives for coalition and compromise.
• The movement/pluralist advocate focuses on opening political space for excluded constituencies.
• Santucci focuses on how different PR systems alter the structure and behavior of parties, factions, and governing coalitions.

1. Here is an interesting essay that handles the distinction somewhat differently.