Vote splitting

This construct has long been a feature of Approval Voting advocacy. It refers to the possibility that two or more likeminded candidates in a plurality election appeal to the same group of voters, thereby dividing that group’s support.

Advocates of Approval Voting (and derivative rules) naturally gravitate to this construct. It is intuitive. It seems like it happens often. And, on its face, it makes a great case for Approval Voting. Heck, you just vote for both candidates!

With the entry of “vote splitting” into high-profile RCV advocacy, it may be time to take a critical view.

Nagel has shown that, under Approval Voting, two candidates appealing to the same group of voters actually have an incentive to encourage vote-splitting. The reason is that each cares about winning.

I am told of similar results for the Alternative Vote (aka IRV/RCV).

What about vote-splitting where everyone thinks it happened? I am talking about prominent presidential elections with minor-party candidates. Two recent studies suggest relatively little vote-splitting in practice: one on Libertarians, then a second on Stein/Greens and Johnson/Libertarians alike.

To find that third-party voters don’t break reliably in either direction is not surprising. Typically, such candidacies reflect the activation of some alternative issue dimension (e.g., climate).

That issue may even be so important (to third-party voters) that they refuse to rank (or approve/score) putative lower choices. Hence the Australian solution: compulsory ranking.

My personal view is that “vote splitting” has become an indulgent kludge. The obvious solution to the purported problem is to unite behind a single candidate. But this just will not do for a certain kind of reformer (indulgent). And it is a kludge because the problem is not demonstrated (nay, demonstrable) empirically — at least without considerable data on the policy preferences of voters and candidates alike.

Yet we will continue to hear about “vote splitting” because, without it, the case for single-seat reform evaporates.

Interesting words from Hermens

What follows is from a conference paper given in 1985, at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (New Orleans). Hermens was wrong about a lot. An example is his insistence on the phrase “majority voting,” which he used to describe anything other than “PR” (which also does not convey much information). On other things, he seems to have been right.

The paper was written in a period of re-polarization. The advice to embrace “majority voting” should be viewed with that development in mind.


Dr. Hallett, who has carried the American banner for P.R. for so many years, recently published an essay entitled “Proportional Representation with the Single Transferable Vote: A Basic Requirement for Legislative Elections.” He considers P.R. a logical implication of the “one-man one-vote” rule and has expressed hope that the Supreme Court will declare it a requirement of the Constitution. This point will apparently be argued before the Court in the case of Davis vs. Bandemer, which centers on gerrymandering, but has caused proponents of P.R. to state that no redistricting under majority voting will do; it has to be P.R. all the way, and the Single Transferable Vote (STV) at that.

In an examination of the issues involved it might be useful to recall what Walter Lippmann wrote two generations ago: “For the most part, we do not first see and then define; we define first and then see.” This statement is more relevant now than it was when originally made, and nowhere more so than in a discussion of electoral systems. In the case of P.R. all essential problems arise from the fact that its proponents first use a concept of representation which takes much for granted of which they ought to prove, and then sees everything in light of that concept. They are thereby depriving themselves of a chance to observe any of the drawbacks which result from the application of P.R. while ignoring the positive aspects of what majority voting contributes to the democratic process.