The local paper of record has endorsed RCV in the context of a crowded Democratic mayoral primary. It also has called for nonpartisan elections (potentially with runoffs). How the latter might affect the former is left to the reader.
The endorsement followed a poll by several pro-RCV groups. One is pushing simultaneously in Harrisburg for open primaries.
I have been following the issue since I got here in early 2019. The Philadelphia Citizenwrote about it in 2016. There were murmurs of interest in good-government circles but not much more. (Hence we found the site useful for a survey experiment.) National groups became vocal in Spring 2021, shortly after New York City adopted RCV for primaries.
I discussed the issue on Philly NPR in late April.* Billy Penn ran a story earlier that week.
Here is a piece I wrote in October 2021. It recommended open-list proportional representation. (The conversation at the time was less mayor-centric.) It also noted that a Philadelphian had invented list PR in the 1840s. This was partly to address the unpredictability of runoffs.
*The interview refers to me as an assistant professor. I am flattered but not one.
This has been my second time (we end in June). Here is how I would do it in the future.
1) Spend 2-3 class sessions on an accessible book that covers much of a (traditional) subfield. Use class to discuss the books the way my high school English teachers did.
2) Have each student choose a theme and write a paragraph on it. Call this the “commitment paragraph.”
3) Group students by some reasonable subfield division. These become “workshops.”
4) Proceed through my existing scaffolding. Workshop that work 1x per week.
5) Decide whether students should write a full paper, just the first 2/3, or just a literature review. This will depend on student energy and whether I have 10 or 14 weeks.
6) Students may final papers solo or in groups of not more than three. That decision is made in the middle of the term, and students sign contracts.
This differs in three ways from what I am doing now. First, it uses a ‘classic text’ to familiarize a basic vocabulary. Now I have each student choose a top-three journal article. That is too broad.
Then it replaces ad hoc groups with standing “workshops.” This might build rapport and lead to cross-fertilization.
Third, it introduces optional coauthorship.
Research design thus taught will reflect the instructor’s specialization(s). This is an asset. The course can rotate.
A discussion about ranked choice voting. Would it make for fairer elections? Joining us is Jack Santucci, assistant professor of politics at Drexel University.
The space of politics is multidimensional. What we call “left” and “right” are negotiated positions.
Interest groups (broadly understood) do the negotiating. They are assumed to want control of government. They form coalitions to get it.
Every democracy has some coalition structure, even if it does not track party division.
‘Shifting coalitions’ lead to electoral reform: incumbent groups seeking insulation, out-of-power groups seeking realignment, or opposing groups seeking to discipline noncommittal players (a polarizing mode).
Electoral reform is change in any of five electoral-system components: assembly size, district magnitude, ballot type, allocation rules, and rules about nominations.
Two-party politics makes it tempting to cater to factions, not parties, when proposing and designing reforms. Witness the current emphasis on ballot type and nominations (ranked-choice, approval voting, nonpartisan primaries). Witness the unpopularity (outside political science) of allocation rules that presume party grouping (such as party-list proportional representation, including mixed-member).
In the past, reformers promoted single transferable vote (STV) and ranking generally in order to cater to factions, not parties.
In other countries, multiparty politics facilitates use of ranked-choice: giving voters understandable entities to rank, instructing voters on how to rank (vote management), regulating candidate entry (vote management), and generating political will to administer a complex system.
In the United States, ranked-choice reforms tended to last as long as the coalitions that imposed them.
Vote management was imperfect and slow to emerge. It usually involved a bipartisan coalition that sold itself in “good government” terms.
Due to vote management, STV produces winners who usually would be the same under open-list proportional representation (OLPR).
An exception is when the coalition structure shifts, such that some voters do not rank candidates in the way that party (or interest-group) leaders might want. Said voters are part of a coalition structure that is different from the prevailing one.
If the alternative coalition deprives “left” and “right” of control of government, they may join in blaming the electoral system. This can lead to a polarizing repeal episode.
Reasons for abandonment of majoritarian ranked-ballot rules are not yet well-understood. One theme in the literature is ranking truncation. Another is the production of surprise results. These may have reinforced each other: many voters not ranking very many choices, determined candidates capitalizing on this.
The repeal of early ranked-choice systems left in place features that had been needed to pass ranked-choice. These include nonpartisan ballots, numbered-post elections, and single-digit assemblies.
It may take some time to educate voters, but that’s OK if it allows us to break away from this wretched two-party system, in which both parties put forth horrible candidates.
The Grand Junction plan has destroyed all municipal political machines. It provides for non-partisan nominations by twenty-five individual petitioners. The headless non-partisan and short ballot was adopted. Such a ballot results practically in an educational qualification for voters, and greatly reduces the number of ignorant and corrupt votes.
