One set can be accessed here. I used it when teaching comparative electoral systems in Spring 2022. The table below gives the contents of the most useful slide, which describes four “types” or “kinds” of RCV. A fifth incorporates numbered-post elections, which are explained here in simple terms.
| Type | District magnitude | Ballot format | Seat allocation |
| Single transferable vote (STV, multi-seat RCV, proportional RCV, etc.) | M > 1 | Ranked | Droop quota, surplus transfer, elimination, repeat until M remain.1 |
| Alternative Vote (AV, Instant Runoff Voting, single-seat RCV, etc.) | M = 1 | Ranked | Droop quota, elimination. |
| Bottoms-up | M > 1 | Ranked | Elimination until M remain. |
| Block-preferential vote (BPV, multi-pass RCV, sequential RCV, etc.) | M > 1 | Ranked | Treat each seat as its own AV count. All ballots from last count continue to next count. |
Looking back, I also see value in explaining that bottoms-up and the Alternative Vote are mechanically the same. This differs from the usual claim that AV is STV’s single-seat form. That is technically true from the perspective of the Droop quota; there is no need to transfer surplus when just one winner is elected. However, the AV/bottoms-up comparison also makes sense because the latter also obviates surplus transfer.
The slides are based on my 2021 article in Politics and Governance:
Abstract: Ranked-choice voting has come to mean a range of electoral systems. Broadly, they can facilitate (a) majority winners in single-seat districts, (b) majority rule with minority representation in multi-seat districts, or (c) majority sweeps in multi-seat districts. Further, such systems can combine with rules to encourage/discourage slate voting. This article describes five major versions used, abandoned, and/or proposed for US public elections: alternative vote, single transferable vote, block-preferential voting, the bottoms-up system, and alternative vote with numbered posts. It then considers each from the perspective of a ‘political strategist.’ Simple models of voting (one with two parties, another with three) draw attention to real-world strategic issues: effects on minority representation, importance of party cues, and reasons for the political strategist to care about how voters rank choices. Unsurprisingly, different rules produce different outcomes with the same sets of ballots. Specific problems from the strategist’s perspective are: ‘majority reversal,’ serving ‘two masters,’ and undisciplined third-party voters (or ‘pure’ independents). Some of these stem from well-known phenomena, e.g., ranking truncation and ‘vote leakage.’ The article also alludes to ‘vote-management’ tactics, i.e., rationing nominations and ensuring even distributions of first-choice votes. Illustrative examples come from American history and comparative politics. A running theme is the two-pronged failure of the Progressive Era reform wave: with respect to minority representation, then ranked voting’s durability.
I also wrote about the “kinds” of RCV for 3streams in late 2023:
The second thing to keep track of is how RCV might change nomination rules.
For example, Alaska, Maine, and New York City all use what’s called AV above. But Alaska uses it to obviate nominations, whereas the other two places use it in nominating primaries. Maine also uses it in congressional general elections.
One way to think about this aspect is: choice among parties (Maine congressional generals), choice within parties (Maine or NYC primaries), and choice without regard to parties (Alaska).