Tyler Cowan’s piece on RCV for Bloomberg is making the rounds this weekend. It elides some taxonomic differences, but I’ll assume most people mean the laissez-faire version now promoted for single-seat elections. The gist of Cowan’s piece is that candidates, in pursuit of voters’ lower rankings, will “moderate their positions and their behavior.”
Below are some excerpts from a 1922 article in the National Municipal Review (NMR). They illustrate a form of coordination failure about which I wrote earlier this week — voters not ranking choices because elites didn’t urge them to, leading to an unexpected winner without a final-round majority.
I just discovered the article, which appears to be a popular-consumption version of points made in the APSR (Maxey 1922). The APSR version describes “the Cleveland election” as one that “will likely go down in history as one of the most notable in American annals” — possibly because it coincided with adoption of a city charter based on single transferable vote, but also because the coordination failure below seems to have helped end advocacy of nonpartisan, single-seat reforms based on ordinal ballots. My guess is that the NMR published its version to signal to readers that the associated League’s priorities had changed.
I do not recommend structuring a paragraph as the one that follows, unless the goal is to hide something from all but attentive readers.
The Republican organization decided to back the incumbent, Mr. FitzGerald; the Democratic organization backed E. B. Haserodt; and Kohler with four others stood as independents. The Cleveland charter with nominations by petition and the preferential ballot was intended to favor the independent candidate, but no candidate without the support of one or the other of the party machines had ever been elected. With the field divided among seven candidates, it looked like a sure thing for one organization or the other. Two things, however, were overlooked in this reckoning: (1) that the people of Cleveland were disgusted with machine politics, and (2) the unique campaign conducted by Mr. Kohler. Mr. Kohler absolutely refused throughout the campaign to make a speech or public address; he announced no program or platform; he did not deny past misconduct or seek to extenuate it; he simply insisted that his record for efficiency and integrity was above reproach, adorned himself with his Rooseveltian decoration, and promised to give Cleveland “the best administration it has ever had.” To get into contact with the voters he used a method that was completely baffling to the opposition. Having developed unusual powers as a pedestrian during the years that he served on the police force as a patrolman, Kohler undertook to make a house-to-house canvass of the city. Exactly how many homes he visited in his solicitation of votes is known only to Kohler himself, but it is certain that he managed to get over practically all of the ground that he deemed important. This type of campaign was especially disconcerting to the other candidates because they had no means of measuring its success, and the inroads he was making upon their strength were not apparent until straw votes near the end of the campaign showed unmistakably that it was a case of Kohler against the field. The election returns showed Kohler leading from the start, and although he did not secure the majority of first choice votes, nor the majority of first and second choice votes necessary to election under the “Mary Ann” ballot, neither did any other candidate. Then under the charter it was necessary to count all choices, and Kohler was found to have a clear plurality of all-choice votes, and was therefore elected.
It should be noted that the electoral system above appears to be based on Bucklin allocation (adding votes), not Hare (transferring them).
Please cite this chapter if you find the above useful in your own research.