Skip to content

Author: Santucci

General effects of Final Five Voting

I am reproducing here a Tweet thread from last week:

I expect a two-serious-candidate equilibrium, with ballot exhaustion driven by the supply of hopeless candidates.

The basic logic comes from Cox (1997). Winning-minded elites will be thinking about the IRV round when deciding whom to back in the “final five” round.

That means we need to think about the strategic context of an IRV election, which will ‘contaminate’ the first round.

What does a winning-minded-elite do in an IRV election? They get together with other winning-minded-elites and coordinate on the person most likely to win.

It turns out that humans have routinized such coordination. The general term for this is “political party.”

It follows that ‘resources’ will not flow to hopeless candidates, leading us straight back to two-party equilibrium. Or, in lopsided districts, two-faction equilibrium.

I covered these issues in my Apr. 2021 review of The Politics Industry. That review included discussion of ‘nonpartisan IRV’ in a two-party-competitive city (Cleveland, 1913-19). TLDR: lots of ballot exhaustion, no independents elected.

People (like me) who oppose Final Five are aware of the dynamics above. Our worry, I think, is that all we’ll have done is weakened political parties even more.

You can’t get parties out of politics… but you can confuse voters in the short term…

…and we don’t know what the world would have looked like if all these nonpartisan elections had never been adopted. Small changes have big consequences… even if parties adapt to nonpartisan elections.

The one-vote system

Kevin Kosar of the American Enterprise Institute generously invited me to do a Q&A on the ‘one-vote system’ — and candidate-based forms of list PR in general. The Q&A builds on my recent op-ed in The Philadelphia Inquirer. You can read the Q&A here.

There’s a tendency in reform circles to ask too much of voters. I’m thinking here of elaborate schemes like RCV, STAR (Score Then Automatic Runoff), and approval. Ballot reforms like these basically ask voters to pick a better coalition. One-vote flips that around — give voters representation, then have their representatives form the coalition. It’s a lot more realistic.

Vote splitting

This construct has long been a feature of Approval Voting advocacy. It refers to the possibility that two or more likeminded candidates in a plurality election appeal to the same group of voters, thereby dividing that group’s support.

Advocates of Approval Voting (and derivative rules) naturally gravitate to this construct. It is intuitive. It seems like it happens often. And, on its face, it makes a great case for Approval Voting. Heck, you just vote for both candidates!

With the entry of “vote splitting” into high-profile RCV advocacy, it may be time to take a critical view.

Nagel has shown that, under Approval Voting, two candidates appealing to the same group of voters actually have an incentive to encourage vote-splitting. The reason is that each cares about winning.

I am told of similar results for the Alternative Vote (aka IRV/RCV).

What about vote-splitting where everyone thinks it happened? I am talking about prominent presidential elections with minor-party candidates. Two recent studies suggest relatively little vote-splitting in practice: one on Libertarians, then a second on Stein/Greens and Johnson/Libertarians alike.

To find that third-party voters don’t break reliably in either direction is not surprising. Typically, such candidacies reflect the activation of some alternative issue dimension (e.g., climate).

That issue may even be so important (to third-party voters) that they refuse to rank (or approve/score) putative lower choices. Hence the Australian solution: compulsory ranking.

My personal view is that “vote splitting” has become an indulgent kludge. The obvious solution to the purported problem is to unite behind a single candidate. But this just will not do for a certain kind of reformer (indulgent). And it is a kludge because the problem is not demonstrated (nay, demonstrable) empirically — at least without considerable data on the policy preferences of voters and candidates alike.

Yet we will continue to hear about “vote splitting” because, without it, the case for single-seat reform evaporates.

Interesting words from Hermens

What follows is from a conference paper given in 1985, at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (New Orleans). Hermens was wrong about a lot. An example is his insistence on the phrase “majority voting,” which he used to describe anything other than “PR” (which also does not convey much information). On other things, he seems to have been right.

The paper was written in a period of re-polarization. The advice to embrace “majority voting” should be viewed with that development in mind.

Dr. Hallett, who has carried the American banner for P.R. for so many years, recently published an essay entitled “Proportional Representation with the Single Transferable Vote: A Basic Requirement for Legislative Elections.” He considers P.R. a logical implication of the “one-man one-vote” rule and has expressed hope that the Supreme Court will declare it a requirement of the Constitution. This point will apparently be argued before the Court in the case of Davis vs. Bandemer, which centers on gerrymandering, but has caused proponents of P.R. to state that no redistricting under majority voting will do; it has to be P.R. all the way, and the Single Transferable Vote (STV) at that.

In an examination of the issues involved it might be useful to recall what Walter Lippmann wrote two generations ago: “For the most part, we do not first see and then define; we define first and then see.” This statement is more relevant now than it was when originally made, and nowhere more so than in a discussion of electoral systems. In the case of P.R. all essential problems arise from the fact that its proponents first use a concept of representation which takes much for granted of which they ought to prove, and then sees everything in light of that concept. They are thereby depriving themselves of a chance to observe any of the drawbacks which result from the application of P.R. while ignoring the positive aspects of what majority voting contributes to the democratic process.